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Inspired by Bakhtin Dialogic Methods in the Humanities Studies in Comparative Literature and Intellectual History Series Editor GALIN TIHANOV (Queen Mary, University of London) Inspired by Bakhtin Dialogic Methods in the Humanities • Edited by MATTHIAS FREISE Boston 2018 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The bibliographic data for this title is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN (hardback) 978-1-61811-738-0 ISBN (electronic) 978-1-61811-739-7 © 2018 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved Book design by Kryon Publishing Services (P) Ltd. www.kryonpublishing.com Cover design by Ivan Grave Published by Academic Studies Press in 2018 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com Table of Contents Introduction#8;vi Matthias Freise#8; Internal Dialogism of Russian Postmodern Literature: Polyphony or Schizophrenia?#8; 1 Maria Andrianova#8; Between Socrates and the Stranger: How Dialogic Are Plato’s Dialogues? #8; 7 Kryštof Boháček#8; The Dialogic Method in Literary History#8; 25 Matthias Freise#8; Towards a Dialogical Sociology#8; 51 Michal Kaczmarczyk#8; Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artifacts#8; 77 Klaus Krippendorff#8; Attachment Patterns in the Bi-Personal Field #8; 112 Reinhard Plassmann#8; Voices in Image: A Methodological and Theoretical Approach to the Dialogic Image of the Other with the European Image of China as an Example#8; 126 Xiaojing Wang#8; List of Contributors#8; 175 Index 176 #8; Introduction Matthias Freise PRELIMINARY REMARKS M any scholars around the world are inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas. For them, his using of the term “dialogue” is one of the key concepts in the humanities. Despite the abundance of interpretations of Bakhtin’s teachings, two fundamental questions regarding his “dialogism” still seem to be unanswered: first—do the objects of other humanities have dialogical qualities similar to those literature has; second—how can we define a dialogic method of research in the humanities in general, what would be the specific qualities of such a method? In this volume, seven scholars—from different countries, rooted in different cultures, working in different fields of the humanities— p ropose answers to the following questions: What in my field of study can be considered a dialogic approach and why is a dialogic approach essential in my field in order to disclose the specific qualities of the material to be analyzed? From these two fundamental questions, the specific questions in the respective fields of study arise: How dialogic is the intercultural encounter in contemporary cinema? What is dialogic design? What are the presuppositions of a successful therapeutic dialogue? On what terms can literary history be called dialogic? How dialogic is postmodern authorship? How dialogic are Plato’s philosophical dialogues? What distinguishes a dialogical sociology? THE HUMANITIES AS A RELATIONAL SCIENCE From a disciplinary point of view, the above questions seem to be rather disparate. It is therefore necessary to explain how they are bound together to a common, truly Bakhtinian approach in the humanities. As different as Introduction vii the problems are that we encounter in our fields of study, there is one central aspect we all have in mind. Mainstream research and practice in the humanities tend to treat their phenomena as “objects” with “properties.” This, we are convinced, is not the proper and necessary approach to what we encounter in our disciplines because what the humanities are mainly and commonly concerned with are phenomena of relationship. Such phenomena require specific—namely, dialogic—approaches. All contributions in this volume are inspired by the idea that a dialogic approach in their field is necessary, even inevitable. Therefore, they appeal for substantial change in the methods of their field. They argue that recent methods of research in the humanities are widely unsuitable for the phenomena they examine. How can this be, despite all erudition? Against the background of a highly “speculative” thinking in the humanities up to the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century the humanities very much endeavored to become more “scientific.” This was, of course, most respectable, but in consequence has guided research further and further away from what could be called a specifically humanitarian approach, designed for the specific dialogical nature of the phenomena to be examined. The humanities, despite having produced more “exact” results than ever, became more and more unspecific in their fields. We are convinced that the scientification of the humanities at the cost of the specificity of their research may result, paradoxically, in the loss of their scientific basis. Therefore, a dialogical method in the humanities is not yet an “alternative” approach. It is, rather, a guideline for finding the most appropriate access to what the phenomena of the humanities in fact are: relationships. Sociology should investigate social relationships, not countable mental properties of individuals. Philosophy (again) should investigate the relationship of the human mind with the world, not the properties of language. Literary history should investigate the relationship to the past, and neither what “objectively” happened nor what we construct to be our history. Theory of design should investigate how design is guided by our encounter with the material world and not by the practical function of a tool. Theology should be concerned with our relationship to God, not with rules fixed in a codex. Psychology should not only understand psyche as a living network of relationships, but should also understand the relationship of the therapist to his or her patient as a bi-personal field. Literature, last but not least, consists of relationships that are neither “objective” nor “subjective,” but rather establish cultural “neurons” that form not only a cobweb in which we entangle ourselves (Max Weber, Clifford Geertz) but one that opens a wide, even endless semantic space for us to move. This space doesn’t bind us, it sets viii Introduction us free. There are special techniques necessary to move within this field and to sketch the streamlines of it. It is, however, noteworthy that our attempts to propagate and legitimate dialogic approaches in our fields expose certain significant differences. This can be seen especially in Boháček’s philosophical account of Plato’s dialogues, and in Kaczmarczyk’s using them to expose an existential concept of dialogue. Boháček examines Plato’s philosophical dialogues for their inherent dialogic quality, while Kaczmarczyk emphasizes that, in some of them, the existential attitude of the participants is necessary to form a “dialogical” dialogue. These approaches are not just “different,” they also expose the two opposite sides of the same problem: for Boháček, the “internal” necessity of the communication to have a dialogic structure, and for Kaczmarczyk, the “external” necessity of the participants to have an existential attitude, which alone opens them to real dialogue. Thus, they are both true, just as both sides of a relationship are equally true. Here, we have a living example of how the dialogue between two disciplines can and should be dialogic. There is, however, one problem shared by all disciplines in the humanities, in case they, as they ought to, investigate relationships. Relationships, in contrast to objects, are invisible. Rigid scholars conclude that, precisely for this reason, they simply do not exist. There is no such thing as a love relationship— just hormonal processes in the brain; there is no social relationship—just needs to be satisfied; there is no relationship to the past—only traces and objects left over for examination; there is no relationship within art—just material form and content to take notice of; there is no relationship to the world to be understood by philosophy—only understandings materialized in language; no relationship to the Divine—only religious needs. Of course, we can ignore non-object phenomena, but there is at least one field of relationship that hardly can be ignored, and that is language. Ferdinand de Saussure proved that language consists not of objects but of relationships, which are labelled by the term “sign.” “Sign” is the expression of a relationship. Most illustrative here is the case of phonology. Before de Saussure, linguists believed that language consisted of sounds. After de Saussure it became clear that it consists of differences between sounds; that is, it consists of relationships. A phoneme is not an object, but a relationship. You cannot investigate the functioning of language without these differences, which cannot be heard directly but have to be reconstructed by juxtaposition. The analysis of language as a relationship is called semiotics. It is a long way, however, from semiotics to an understanding of all phenomena of the humanities being dialogic. After the “semiotic turn” in the 1960s and 1970s all fields in Introduction ix the humanities were subordinated to language. Everything was language. This is typical with the humanities and their “turns.” Given the “relational” character of one humanitarian discipline, scholars conclude that all cognate disciplines are derivations of the one in which this character was encountered. In fact, there is no leading discipline in the humanities. Philosophy is not dialogic “because it consists of language,” but it is dialogic in the same regard that language is. It has its own specific dialogic character which has to be explained within philosophy. As a result, we do not harken “back to semiotics.” Even scholars within semiotics themselves have not fully understood the relational character of the sign. They never performed the mental leap from description to interpretation, because interpretation seemed arbitrary to them. Here, the hard labor of convincing them is necessary. And this labor can be provided by literary scholarship because literary scholarship successfully developed strategies of plausibility within a field of concurring interpretations. Of course, even philology has recently tended toward “scientification.” Digital humanities, cultural transfer research, neuronal reception research, and the revival of the sociology of literature dominate the scene. However, literary analysis has developed the tools to illuminate semantic spaces provided by the “neurons” of literary texts. Therefore, it could serve as a pioneer for an alliance between scholars equally frustrated by mainstream “exact” research in the humanities. It is this mainstream that also tends to repel students at universities. Students expect, for example, genuine philosophical understanding, but teachers convince them that “truth is what is the case.” At German universities an average of ninety percent of philosophy students drop out before the bachelor of arts exam. Mainstream philosophers would argue that students expect from philosophy mere “metaphysical speculation” and are not ready to accept that philosophy requires logics, logics, and logics. Relationships, however, are no less logical than objects, but the logics of relation are different from the logics of property. The primary aim of the contributions in this volume is to restore for the humanities the goal of dialogic understanding, which requires interpretation. All contributors formulate the dialogic character of the phenomena they investigate or of the method they develop. They are convinced that such an approach is able to give a fresh outlook on their field of study. At the same time, by sharing a dialogic method, we get the chance to unite the humanities in a common scientific effort. This provides the humanities with new epistemological power—one that is highly needed, and not only for the humanities as a field of study. The humanities are not, in : Universitätsverlag, 2006), 74-75. References Cassirer, Ernst. Substance and function and Einstein’s theory of relativity. London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923. Derrida, Jacques. La voix et la phénoméne. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl [Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs]. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967. Dilthey, Wilhelm. „Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie“ [Ideas On a Describing and Parsing Psychology]. In: Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, 139-240. Berlin: Teubner, 1924. Freise, Matthias. Michail Bachtins philosophische Ästhetik der Literatur [Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical aesthetics of literature]. New York: Peter Lang, 1993. Freise, Matthias. „Vier Weisen nach dem Text zu fragen“ [Four ways to inquire after the text]. In Finis coronat opus, Festschrift für Walter Kroll zum 65. Geburtstag, 71-84. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag, 2006. Freud, Sigmund. “Advice to Doctors on Psychoanalytic Treatment.” In Wild Analysis, translated by Alan Bance, 31-42. London: Penguin, 2002. Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Edited and translated by James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961. Wahrheit und Methode. Gadamer, Hans Georg. Tübingen: Mohr, 1965. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall as Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989). Gauthier, Yvon. Internal Logic. Foundations of Mathematics from Kronecker to Hilbert. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Springer, 2002. Grondin, Jean. Einführung in die philosophische Hermeneutik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer as Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). Habermas, Jürgen. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981. Translated by Thomas McCarthy as Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984-1987). Heidegger, Martin. Die Frage nach dem Ding [The question concerning the thing]. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962. Introduction xxix Ivanov, Vjacheslav I. “The Significance of M. M. Bakhtin’s Ideas on Sign, Utterance, and Dialogue for Modern Semiotics.” Soviet Studies in Literature 11, issue 2-3 (1975): 186-243. Kołakowski, Leszek. Husserl and the Search for Certitude. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phénoménologie de la perception [Phenomenology of perception]. Paris: Gallimard, 1945. Mill, John Stuart. Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. Vol. 9 of Collected Works. Edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979. Morson, Gary Saul. “The Heresiarch of META,” PTL III (1978): 379-385. Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Voloshinov, Valentin. Freidizm. New York: Chalidze, 1983. Windelband, Wilhelm. Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft [History and science]. Straßburg: Heitz, 1894. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Charles K. Ogden. L University of New York Press, 2004. The Dialogic Method in Literary History Matthias Freise INTRODUCTION S cholarship in general—and therefore also literary scholarship—aims at the generalizing and classifying of phenomena. Literary history, like historiography in general, seems to be an exception to this aim. In the field of literary history, any attempt to get beyond description seems to be unscholarly. Contemporary theory of history, ever since Hayden White published his groundbreaking works on the narrativity of historiography, seems to advise scholarship to refrain from any attempt to understand the flow of history. Otherwise, we seem to inevitably end up exploiting history for our own ideological purposes. However, the subjective narrativity of historiography is only one side of a complex correlation between the cultural present and the cultural past, which I would like to call, with reference to Mikhail Bakhtin’s teachings, a dialogue. Therefore, in the following essay, I will try to demonstrate that a dialogic approach to literary history will provide us with the means of understanding and categories of classification that—despite the evident subjectivity on both sides of the dialogue—can understand the dialogue itself, and therefore be fully scientific and of value for literary scholarship. TIME AND STYLE Is there a regulating principle in literary history? Or is literary history chaotic, unpredictable, and fragmented? Is all order imputed to literary history by literary historians? Do literary epochs “have” distinct characteristics, or have these characteristics been distilled by subsequent views that simply neglect all incongruous elements, that is, they “forget” literary texts that do not fit into the 26 Inspired by Bakhtin: Dialogic Methods in the Humanities 1 scheme of what a literary epoch allegedly is concerned with? Contemporary literary historical research in Europe tends to avoid literature-specific terms of epochs—instead, we find terms deduced from important historic events such as the “inter-war period” (Poland), and terms deduced from important authors such as “Goethezeit” (Germany), or terms simply referring to decades, such as “the Sixties.” Of course, no one will ever prove the objective limits of an epoch. This is due to the mere fact that time alone is not enough to determine to which epoch a given text belongs. Even hard-core empiricists would agree that there are precursors of a style and epigones of a style, who write at a time when other style formations are dominant. Therefore, at a given moment, epigones of style 2 “a” coexist with executers of the dominant style “b” and precursors of style “c.” Consequently, in order to determine an epoch, in addition to the factor time 3 we have to consider the factor style. 4 But what is style? Originally this term had a double meaning. On the one hand, it designated the intentional style as an expression of individuality, on the other hand, it is related to the normative “aptum” of a genre or language level to be chosen. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Heinrich Wölfflin used “style” to designate epochs. Not as substances, however, but shaped by contrast to an alternate style. Later in the twentieth century, “style” was considered as 5 a category of observation, and, eventually, Svetlana Alpers declared: “Style is 6 what you make it.” This is, however, not so much a problem of a subjectivity of judgement, because “style” is a term that decidedly designates form. Form is not subjective, and to see form does not require a judgement. The problem is that an epoch does not get shape without the function of form. Forms are   1 Comp. Helga Möbius and Harald Olbrich, „Zur Problematik der Begriffe ‚früh‘ und ‚spät‘ im kunsthistorischen Prozeß“ [On the problem of the terms ‘early’ and ‘late’ in the art history Stil und Epoche. Periodisierungsfragen, process], in eds. Friedrich Möbius and Helga Sciurie (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1989), 253-254: „Jede Stileinheit […] muß zurückdrängen, was in das Evolutionskonstrukt einer fernsichtigen, geschlossenen Totalität nicht hineinpaßt.” 2 Comp. Roman Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” in Readings in Russian Poetics, eds. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 38-46.   3 Comp. Aleksandar Flaker, Stilske formacje [Formation of stylistics] (Zagreb: Sveučil. Nakl. Liber, 1976).   4 On the following comp. Stephan Hoppe, „Stil als dünne oder dichte Beschreibung“ [Style as thin or thick description], in Stil als Bedeutung in der nordalpinen Renaissance, eds. Stephan and Sebastian Fitzner (Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner, 2008), 63.   5 Ibid., 59.   6 Svetlana Alpers, “Style Is What You Make It: The Visual Arts Once Again,” in The Concept of Style, ed. Leonard B. Meyer (Philadelphia: University o ung [Abstraction and empathy]. Neuwied: Heuser, 1907. Towards a Dialogical Sociology Michal Kaczmarczyk 1. INTRODUCTION T he famous quantum physicist David Bohm wrote that one of the main obstacles to dialogue lies in the human inability to differentiate between one’s tentative opinion and one’s personal background, which consists of past experiences, emotions, and a sense of identity. According to Bohm, we tend to defend our thoughts as parts of our person, but on the other hand it is precisely the fragmentation of the world by thinking that is responsible for the errors and illusions of our cognition. As Bohm puts it, “thought is very active, but the process of thought thinks that it is doing nothing – that it is just telling you the 1 way things are.” In other words, each thought has a blind spot which is the process of thought itself. This incessant process produces conjectures and images that order the world and secure a sense of continuity to the thinking subject. Therefore the gradual process of identity-building by thinking has a dark side: the immunization of individuals against a critical self-awareness and, as a consequence, a loss of truth. For this reason, dialogue poses a theoretical problem: being focused on one’s own thoughts enhances narratives that harmonize with the paths of action taken in the past and makes them unquestionable, while they may be precisely the problem. In this paper, I will depict sociology as an art of dealing with a specific aspect of that fundamental problem. In the first section, I will illustrate the problem by comparing selected classical concepts of sociology and society. In the second section, I will differentiate between dialogue, communication, and interaction.   First published in Polish Sociological Review 193, no. 1 (Winter 2016).   1 David Bohm, On Dialogue (New York: Routledge, 1996), 11-12. 52 Inspired by Bakhtin: Dialogic Methods in the Humanities The third section will introduce the existential idea of dialogue. Finally, the concluding, fourth section will demonstrate the dialogical practices in sociology. 2. THOUGHT AND SOCIETY What is really interesting and controversial in sociology is neither the human being nor the society in their respective solitude but the relationship between individual and society or, to quote the famous handbook by Peter Berger and 2 Thomas Luckmann the internalization of the society in the individual and the externalization of the individual in the society. These simultaneous processes may be interpreted as metaphors of the problem of dialogue highlighted by Bohm. Let’s turn first to the Weberian idea of sociology. Weber defines “society” on different occasions, once with reference to Tönnies’ concept of 3 4 Gesellschaft, once as a “general structural form” of communities.” But at the heart of his idea of sociology lies a continuous interest in the conduct of individual actors who orient themselves either at the expectations of others or at 5 social orders. According to this concept, societies are no more than complex bundles of conjectures produced by actors who advocate their more or less stable interests. As a result, the essence of social reality is a lengthy conflict between parties who continue to produce sophisticated justifications of their positions. The immanent problems of the following rationalization processes lead to a general pessimistic outlook of the Weberian sociology. The most significant counterpart of this position had been proposed by Emile Durkheim. The problem of dialogue may be found in his texts in the context of utterly different concepts. Instead of juxtaposing thinking actors with their emancipated thoughts, Durkheim contrasts two theoretically opposed realms of 6 thought: the individual and the collective representations. The relationships between these two kinds of experiences, judgments, and interpretations of reality take different forms among various cultures. Remarkably, when modern societies become more interdependent, as a consequence of mushrooming contracts   2 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books, 1966).   3 Max Weber. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie [Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology] (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1976), 22.  4 Weber, Wirtschaft, 212.   5 Ibid., 11-12.   6 Emile Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy, by T. R. Kuhn (New York: Hampton Press, 2011), 23-46. 86 Inspired by Bakhtin: Dialogic Methods in the Humanities nor drivers. Physical phenomena are indifferent to language. For e xample, everything that happens before the trigger of a loaded weapon is pulled is social. It involves the consideration of alternatives, is embedded in communications, and is open to conversations—at least ideally. Once a bullet has left the weapon, causality governs its trajectory and no argument can change 19 its course. Physical explanations may well enter human interactions after language has run its course. The above examples suggest that the experience of constraints on genuine conversations generate numerous forms of human communication whose decreasing dialogical freedom suggests a continuum, on which one can also locate discourses. That freedom may become constrained beyond discourse, up to the point at which routine and repetitious interactions become replaceable by mechanisms and computational algorithms, including violence. The reality of computations is always designed, that is, of human origin, but its characteristics are unlike human interaction. On this continuum, computational mechanisms can be considered the extreme opposite of genuine conversation, as depicted in Figure 1.  Communication  Discourse  Computation Genuine Conversation  What Distinguishes Discourses from Conversations and from Each Other? Let me move along the continuum in Figure 1, defining discourse and illustrating its definition with the help of three of its genres. To be clear, I deviate from the most common dictionary definitions of discourse that limit it to a body of writing. This is also Foucault’s starting definition from on top of which he constructed power as an all-embracing regime. I am pursuing a more grounded conception, briefly defined as the social use of language in talk, text, communication, and actions, and what it produces or leaves behind. To start, all of the well-known discourses—legal, medical, religious, mathematical—are housed in specialized communities, can be practiced across different natural languages, but are incommensurate relative to each other. For example, mathematicians speak a language that lawyers have no reason to understand. Indian computer programmers can communicate more easily with American or Russian computer programmers than with, say, psychoanalysts. The legal discourse has nothing to do with the discourse of geologists, astronomers, 19 Klaus Krippendorff, “Undoing Power,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12, no. 2 (1995): 101-132. Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artifacts 87 physicists, p oliticians, and m edical professionals. Incommensurability is what distinguishes unlike discourse genres. Moreover, discourses exist only when practiced. Individual members of discourse communities are never permanently engaged with each other. For example, they go home after work and engage in family matters. People can also move through different discourses provided they have the competence and required certifications to cross their boundaries. So, when statisticians see a medical doctor, they enter the medical discourse as patients. When students demonstrate for political change, they play a role in the public discourse. With this rough sketch, let me spell out the 20 dimensions that I believe all discourses have in common, some more decisively than others. DISCOURSES • Manifest themselves materially in a body of discourse-specific artifacts they characteristically produce and attend to. Artifacts may consist of texts, objects, theories, social practices, technologies, and physical structures—everything that remains after their participants have left. kept alive by a discourse community • Are whose members use specialized vocabularies that give them a sense of understanding each other, are able to work together, attend to their body of artifacts, and manage their communities as participants. • Institutionalize recurrent practices, for instance, by ensuring the correct use of their vocabularies, whether in the form of official dictionaries or publication style manuals, requiring references to canonical texts, standardizing methods for inquiry into, constructing and evaluating their artifacts. Discourses may support journals that regularly inform members of their discourse community of relevant developments. There are educational tracks, certifications, presentations, titles and offices that preserve the stability and coherence of a discourse, generally beyond the lifespan of their contributors. • Maintain their own boundaries within which they organize themselves. The boundary of a discourse distinguishes between what, 20 Krippendorff, “ 31 Protzen and Harris, The Universe of Design, 188-95. 100 Inspired by Bakhtin: Dialogic Methods in the Humanities By definition, stakeholders have diverse interests, possess the intellectual and material resources to support or oppose a design, can articulate their convictions publicly, and are able to mobilize others to their cause. Whether designed artifacts end up populating the public domain depends on their designers’ ability to anticipate their stakeholders’ voices and convince them of the benefits of playing a part in realizing them. The need to listen to those on whom the success of a design depends is not a new suggestion. Market research has informed design practices since the industrial era. By contrast, recent calls for user-centered design have become fashionable. Market research assumed that the buyers of industrial products are the only ones that count. User-centered design assumed the so-called end-users are the ones who matter. Such narrow focuses have the effect of hiding the diverse stakeholders in a design who ultimately determine whether it succeeds or is forgotten. The stakeholders of a design certainly include its projected users or consumers; but they also include the designers’ clients who listen to their ideas and pass them on to decision makers. They involve the board members of a corporation who deliberate on whether a design fits its public image. They may embrace engineers who work out the technical details for the artifact to be produced and to work reliably. The voices of bankers who consider investing in its production surely play a role. There typically are government regulators, marketing experts, advertisers, distributors, sellers, and, following the actual realization of the artifact, there are critics, suppliers of needed resources, and advocacy groups worried about the political, economic, or ecological consequences of the design. The stakeholders of any design do not consist of uniform masses of individuals, as in conceptions of a market of buyers. Stakeholders differ vastly in what a design means to them, the intellectual and economic resources they are willing to make available, and their ability to cooperate in networks that can bring a design to fruition. Some such stakeholder networks may be readily available, such as networks of supplier to a manufacturer, but most stakeholders pursue their own stakes in a design and relate to each other not by previous collaborations. They have to be energized by the designers’ project and willing to do more than merely follow instructions. To succeed, the artifacts of a design discourse would have to have attributes that not only encourage the needed networks of stakeholders to form but also find a path through them. Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artifacts 101 In view of the foregoing, a design discourse that conceptualizes its artifacts as symbolic representations of what designers want to see realized—for example, artistic renderings of designers’ visions— may not go very far. And designs conceived as product specifications or instructions that stakeholders are to follow are effective only in established social structures that are commanded by authorities. The artifacts that have a good chance to succeed need to be designed to inspire enroll them into the designers’ project, diverse stakeholders, suggest meanings that stakeholders can enact with the resources available to them, and become the catalysts for the emergence of networks that facilitate their eventual realization. When introducing the iPad, Steve Jobs was convinced that it would “create its own landing strip.” His metaphor suggests that the best designs enlist their stakeholders into cooperatives that assure their futures. Taking dialogue seriously amounts to a considerable gestalt switch in conceptualizing culturally relevant artifacts that a design discourse needs to create. • Its discourse community. Designers have no problem recognizing the community to which they belong. They know each other as professionals able to talk of their work. They share knowledge of iconic designs, influential designers, the schools they subscribe to or oppose, and where they had meet professionally. They can talk of their specializations, and what inspires them. However, the path to enter the community of designer is not as formalized as in other discourses. For example, PhD degrees in design have become more frequent lately but are far from being a ticket to membership in the community of designers. Some designers even consider academic qualifications obstacles to being competent designers, and they may have a point, as advanced degrees are often earned in disciplines that are epistemologically incompatible with the design discourse, for example, art history, advertisement, or engineering. Moreover, designers often work in teams with experts from other disciplines or in design offices that employ designer who cannot avoid engaging each other in creative conversations. • Institutionalization of recurrent practices. It should not be surprising that this somewhat loosely-defined community of designers has been less successful in institutionalizing essential design practices. Of course, many universities have departments that teach one kind of design or another. They tend to develop around particular philosoph re continues. 71 Wang, Jenseits des Orientalismus, 198-210. 72 Ibid., 211-96. The Dialogic Image of the Other 149 Table 1  Three types of the image of the other Monologic image Middle image Dialogic image Autonomous No Yes Yes subjects Equal rights No No/Yes Yes Polyphony No No/Yes Yes Interaction/ No No Yes Mutual influence Unfinalizability No No Yes Power relation self > other self > other; self = other self < other General thought/ self centred self centred; relative; dialectic; idea relative deconstructive 3.3. Interim summary In this section, five relevant factors of dialogic quality in the image of the other were summarized from Bakhtin’s dialogism theory: autonomous subjects, equal rights, polyphony, interaction/mutual influence, and unfinalizability. Accordingly, the image of the other can be divided into three types (see Table 1): They are the monologic image, the middle image, and the dialogic image. The monologic image does not have any factor of dialogic quality. The other is the disguise, puppet, mouthpiece of the image-maker. Images that satisfy some of these factors are called middle images. In comparison to the monologic image, the middle image is a step forward, but still cannot be considered a dialogic image. An image of the other can be described as a dialogic image only when it includes all of the five factors. Films such as Clean, Chinaman, Gomorra, and Qu’est-ce qu’on a fait au Bon Dieu? meet this condition. The power relation in these images of the other is equal. The thought behind the image is relative, dialectic, or even deconstructive. 4. DIALOGIC IMAGE OF CHINA IN EUROPEAN FILMS In the twenty-first century, the dialogic image of China appears in European films such as the aforementioned French films Clean and Qu’est-ce qu’on a fait au Bon Dieu?, the Danish film Chinaman, and the Italian film Gomorra. The 150 Inspired by Bakhtin: Dialogic Methods in the Humanities Signifier A Signified A plot and deceitful Chinese man, re-presentation charming Chinese woman Sign A = Signifier B Signified B deceitful Chinese man, charming exotic Chinese woman temptation Sign B = Signifier C Signified C exotic temptation Orientalism Sign C Figure 6  Signification-model: The manifest layer of the image of China in Chinaman. image of China in the film Chinaman can be regarded as a typical example of 73 the dialogic image. Chinaman (2005) was directed by Henrik Ruben Genz, and tells the story of a sham intermarriage. The hero, Keld Decker, is a plumber. After 25 years of marriage, his wife Rie leaves him. He becomes very depressed and neglects his work. He often goes to a Chinese restaurant, ordering every dish from the menu because he cannot cook. One day the water pipes in the kitchen of the Chinese restaurant burst and Keld helps to repair them. Thus, a friendship between Keld and the restaurant owner Feng develops. Feng asks Keld to marry his sister Ling for the sake of her residence permit in Denmark. In return, Feng promises to give Keld 8,000 Krone. Since Keld’s ex-wife Rie demanded 8,000 Krone as a divorce settlement, he accepts Feng’s request. After a joyful wedding, Keld and Ling live together in Keld’s apartment. Ling is pretty and competent but does not speak Danish. They communicate through facial expressions and gestures. All the same, they gradually fall in love. Unfortunately, however, soon afterwards Ling dies of a congenital heart defect. After the funeral, Rie gives Keld back most of the divorce settlement. With this money, Keld brings Ling’s urn back to China. At first glance, the manifest layer of Chinaman looks like a stereotypical story of Orientalism (see Figure 6): A Western man marries a Chinese 73 The film Chinaman was produced and released in 2005. The director of the film is Henrik Ruben Genz; the cast include Bjarne Henriksen (Keld), Junmei Wu / Vivian Wu (Ling), and Linkun Wu (Feng). The Dialogic Image of the Other 151 woman; members of mainstream society help the marginalized immigrants; the Chinese woman looks elegant and charming in her cheongsam; the Chinese man is a crafty old devil. Nevertheless, when we turn our attention from the expressed contents to the way of the expression—and especially to the structural relations among the expressions—the latent layers of the film begin to be revealed. 4.1. Autonomous subjects 74 In 1837 Hegel’s Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Geschichte was published. Hegel relegated China to a settled existence of its own, which plays no active 75 part in historical progress. Thus, a stereotypical perception treating China as stagnant and ahistorical was created. China was hence treated as an “it,” a non-autonomous object existing outside of time. Accordingly, nobody cares 76 why Dr. Fu Manchu is so evil, as though he were born to be demon; and 77 Shangri-La, in the novel Lost Horizon, can disappear from the world as swiftly as it appeared. Nevertheless, by portraying the history of the Chinese family Feng, Chinaman regards China not as “it,” but as “you,” namely another autonomous “I” with its own consciousness. Feng is the owner of the Chinese restaurant. The parents of Feng are the first generation of the family who stay in Denmark; Feng and his brothers and sisters are the second generation; Feng’s son is the third generation. The three generations live together in a house and reveal various personalities and different modes of life. The parents of Feng are about 70 years old. There are predominantly three film scenes that are concerned with the parents of Feng. 78 First, they watch a Chinese martial arts movie attentively. At this moment, Keld comes in. The mother asks sternly: “Who is the man with big nose?” 79 Second, Feng’s mother is cleaning the room with a vacuum cleaner, while his 80 father still sits on the sofa reading a newspaper. Third, at the funeral of their daughter Ling, the mother says emphatically that Ling’s ashes must be brought 74 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Geschichte [Lecture on the philosophy of history] (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1837). 75 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 216. 76 Sax Rohmer, The Mystery of Dr. Fu Manchu (London: Methuen, 1913). 77 James Hilton, Lost Horizon (London: Macmilla